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What in the World is Going On? 
A Consideration of the 
California Euthanasia Proposal 
by Edward R. Grant 
Mr. Grant, a Chicago attorney, delivered this talk at the Inter-
professional Symposium sponsored by the Illinois State Bar Association 
on May 12,1988. 
The quiet but powerful groundswell of support for relaxing the taboo 
against euthanasia has been evident since the beginning of the decade. In 
1985, the Surgeon General of the United States sounded the warning in a 
speech referring to the "euthanasia juggernaut." Dr. Koop predicted that 
euthanasia would become a means to medicalize the social problem of 
caring for the forthcoming boom of elderly, dependent patients. The 
potential savings in health care costs, as well as the relief that could be 
provided to suffering patients and their families, would make legalized 
euthanasia too tempting for society to pass up. And, as Dr. Koop noted the 
following year in a speech at the Notre Dame University Law School, the 
erosion in legal prohibitions against mercy-killing is well underway. 
This is why the outraged tone of the response to the "Debbie" case 
caught me by surprise. Consider these quotes from the letters column of 
the April 8 issue of The Journal of the American Medical Association. A 
professor of law and medicine at the University of Chicago: "I suggest the 
physician involved find himself a criminal defense lawyer - he's going to 
need one." 
Two lawyer-ethicists at Boston University: "A textbook example of 
medical arrogance, ignorance, and criminal conduct." The directors of 
four of the nation's leading institutions in the study of medical ethics: 
"What in the world is going on?" These experts in medical ethics were 
clearly aware - or should have been - of the forces which have made the 
discussion of this physician's deliberate homicide of his patient a matter 
for polite discussion. What's going on is a classic advent of social 
engineering, embraced by many out of the highest motives of compassion, 
but nevertheless directed at the most vulnerable persons in our society. 
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We must move beyond the "Debbie" case, therefore, to the question of 
what is to be done. Are we to legalize mercy killing, as Mr. Humphry 
lobbies for in California? Or shall we draw the line, however difficult that 
may be, and insist that the one who heals shall not also be the one who 
kills? 
The many facets of that question cannot be answered in these brief 
remarks. But it is useful to return to that question, posed by Dr. Siegler 
and his three distinguished colleagues: "What in the world is going on?" -
specifically, what does the attempt to legalize euthanasia in California 
mean for American law and medicine? 
Many Ironies 
Among the many ironies of the "Debbie" case was the criticism voiced 
by supporters of legalized euthanasia. The president of Hemlock of Illinois 
wrote: "We condemn the Debbie case as both illegal and unethical." 
Physician aid-in-dying, he stated, may only be permitted under these 
circumstances: I) legal documentation of the patient's request for 
euthanasia; 2) the physician performing the aid-in-dying must have known 
the patient, been fully aware of the medical history, and the desire for 
euthanasia; 3) the physician must have a second opinion confirming the 
terminal condition. Mr. Humphry confidently added that if the Debbie 
incident had taken place in America after passage of his Humane and 
Dignified Death Act , "(The doctor) would be prosecuted." Given the 
frustration of the authorities who have investigated the Debbie case, Mr. 
Humphry's prediction is curious. And consider - if it were perfectly legal 
for a physician to kill a patient in Debbie's condition if that patient had 
signed a directive, isn't it more than likely that such killings will occur 
regardless of such directives? If killing is seen as merciful, even therapeutic, 
in the first case, wouldn't it be equally merciful and therapeutic in the 
second? 
However much its proponents may say to the contrary, the Humane and 
Dignified Death Act cannot ensure that such "unauthorized" mercy-
killings will not occur. Nor can the act ensure that euthanasia will not be 
extended beyond the paradigm case of the terminally ill and pain-ridden 
patient. Indeed, the act, when read in conjunction with recent judicial 
developments, ensures just the opposite. 
First, the act clearly attempts to place direct killing, called aid-in-dying, 
on a par basis with decisions to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or 
withdrawn. The act states that aid-in-dying is only for the terminally ill. 
But how long will this limitation be honored? Consider the case law from 
California itself. The right to refuse medical treatment, including nutrition 
and hydration, is not limited to the terminally ill. In the second Bouvia 
decision, the California appellate court held that Elizabeth Bouvia's 
decision to starve herself was fully justified, given her great impairment. 
[quadriplegia]. No terminal illness was required to invoke this right. One 
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judge went even further, writing that the state, rather than seeking to 
preserve Miss Bouva's life, should seek ways to help her end it, painlessly. 
If the case of a similar patient seeking aid-in-dying were to come before this 
panel, can anyone seriously predict that the court would refuse the plea, 
citing the statute's limitation of terminal illness? 
Entitlement Problems 
In broader terms , if the state is to create an entitlement to aid-in-dying 
for the terminally ill, what basis is there for denying that entitlement to 
those who claim to suffer as much as, or more than , the terminally ill? 
While the terminal cancer or AI DS patient presents the paradigm case for 
euthanasia, the case for euthanasia is no less compelling for the chronically 
dependent victims of strokes, Alzheimer's disease , senile dementia , ALS , 
Batten's disease, or severe trauma. Indeed, the case may be stronger in 
these situations. The percentage of cancer patients for whom pain cannot 
be controlled is small , and suffering will end, upon death, in a relatively 
short time. In contrast, the numbers of those with severe and permanent 
neurological deficit will grow as America ages, and the burden these 
patients present to the health care system, and to family, can persist 
indefinitely. The courts have cited such burdens in permitting life-
sustaining treatment to be withdrawn from such patients. If the legislature 
or a plebiscite amends the homicide law to permit mercy-killing, the courts 
will cite these burdens as justification for extending that entitlement. Time 
and time again, American courts have extended the right to remove 
life-sustaining medical care beyond the circumstances permitted in state 
living statutes. Yet, in each case, after having overridden the express 
limitations of the legislature's statute, and having drafted ajudicial statute 
to take its place, the courts conclude with a ritual plea for "legislative 
standards" that will keep such cases out of court. After 10 years of this, we 
all know what will happen if even a strictly limited entitlement to aid-in-
dying finds its way onto the statute books. Litigation will multiply, and 
courts will find it exceedingly difficult to limit euthanasia to the terms of 
the statute. 
To paraphrase the comment of a learned professor of history: "The 
American judiciary takes to the slippery slope with the glee of a small boy 
dragging along his very first sled." So when we talk about legalizing 
voluntary euthanasia, honesty compels us to consider the full range of 
patients for whom this entitlement will become a reality. 
A Second Consideration 
Second, we must consider whether the entitlement to euthanasia will 
long remain strictly a voluntary choice. On its face, the Humane and 
Dignified Death Act permits the exercise of aid-in-dying in reliance upon 
an advance directive . For an incompetent patient, however, someone 
other than that patient will have to decide when, and under what 
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circumstances, to put that directive into effect. Anyone who is familiar 
with American jurisprudence on this question since the Quinlan case can 
see what is coming next. The courts have not considered a written directive 
essential to authorize removal of treatment and nutrition from an 
incompetent patient. Nor have the courts insisted upon clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes, or any evidence at all. 
Consider the case of Clarence Herbert, a California man who arrested in 
the recovery room following routine surgery, and remained in a coma. 
Two days after the arrest, his physicians, with family permission, turned 
off his ventilator. When the patient survived, to his doctor's surprise, they 
ordered removal of his feeding tubes. In the subsequent court case, no 
evidence of the patient's wishes regarding treatment under such 
circumstances was recorded. Yet, the doctors were exonerated, for their 
actions were found to be consistent with the standards set forth for the 
treatment of such patients by Quinlan. If aid-in-dying is to become a 
standard and accepted form of therapy for patients in certain conditions, 
what medical basis is there for requiring the consent of the patient, who is 
now incompetent? Certainly there will be no legal barrier. The doctrines of 
substituted judgment and best interests of the patient, affirmed in dozens 
of cases involving life-support treatment, will be invoked by those who 
stand in the position of Karen Quinlan's father. 
If there were any doubt whether the humane and dignified death act 
permits such developments, consider section 2526.1 of the act. 
This title shall not impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility 
which any person may have to effect the withdrawal or withhold ing of life-
sustai ning procedures or administering aid-in-dying in any lawful manner. In this 
respect the provisions of the title are cumulative. 
By its very terms, therefore, the Humane and Dignified Death Act does 
not universally govern the practice of aid-in-dying, and the door for 
judicial amendment is wide open. Under the Bouvia decision, aid-in-dying 
is likely to become available for the handicapped or chronically ill, who are 
not terminal. Under the Barber decision, and those of the New Jersey 
courts, aid-in-dying will become available to those incompetent patients 
who have not signed a directive, but whose family is permitted to substitute 
its judgment. 
Concluding Points 
Finally, as aid-in-dying becomes more firmly ingrained in medical 
practice and ethics , aid-in-dying for those who have never had the capacity 
to make treatment decisions will be considered. The current ethical 
arguments in favor of euthanasia do not rest solely on the principle of 
consent. Historically, no serious literature in favor of euthanasia has so 
relied . Rather, the coml11on thread, running through the German 
euthanasia literature of the 1890's and 1920's, through the English and 
American arguments of today, is that there is such a thing as a life not, 
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or no longer, worth living. Under this ethic, euthanasia is seen as 
beneficent. It is not , as its proponents claim, simply a matter of personal 
choice. Rather, enactment of such a law will indelibly affect our society's 
entire attitude toward the terminally ill, the comatose, the profoundly 
handicapped, and the aged. Removing the 2500-year-old taboo against 
euthanasia is no "modest" proposal. If we are to debate the proposition, let 
us at least know what we are about. 
Much of what I have said may be characterized as "slippery slope" 
argumentation. Mr. Humphry and his colleagues dismiss this line of 
argument as a "parade of horribles," not responsive to their own modest 
and carefully crafted proposals. My response is two-fold. First, I am not 
arguing about a parade of horribles which may occur if euthanasia is 
legalized. Rather, I am pointing out what the immediate effect of the act 
will be, given the current state of judicial decisions in this area. Second, I 
submit that this type of argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. Legal 
philosophers have long recognized that certain actions are so generally 
harmful to people that the law prohibits those actions in order to protect 
the common good. This prohibition does not allow exceptions for 
individual discretion, even when it can be shown that the harm which the 
law seeks to prevent will not occur. The common good, therefore, is not to 
be placed at risk by private discretion or self-exemption from the law. 
Prof. Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law School, 
responds in this way to those who dismiss the "slippery slope," and 
particularly, any reference to the German euthanasia program. 
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It cannot happen here . Well, maybe it cannot, but ... no small number of our 
supreme court opinions stem from the feat that it can happen here unless we darn 
well rnakesure that it does not by adamantly holding the line. To flick off the fears 
about legalized euthanasia as a parade of horrors is to sweep away much of the 
ground on which all our civil liberties rest. 
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